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PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2010: THE TIME FOR CHANGE IS NOW
© 2011 Shivan Mehta

I. The Patent Reform Act of 2010
The Patent Reform Act of 2010 is a significant undertaking that will modernize
the patent system by harmonizing American creativity and innovation with that of other
developed countries. Continuous pressure and valid attempts to reform the patent system
have existed throughout the last decade; however, the Patent Reform Act of 2010 has
presented the most advantageous changes to the current patent system.
This note concentrates on details surrounding the major reformations present in
the Patent Reform Act of 2010, which are expected to impact the American patent
system. Much controversy is associated with many of the reforms due to the varying
effects the Act stands to generate as a result of its ratification. Although the opinions of
both the proponents and opponents of this Act are discussed, this note inherently
appreciates and acknowledges the ultimate benefit the Reform Act of 2010 will render on
the American technology market, i.e., synchronizing the processes for American
creativity and innovation with those of developed countries and possibly stimulating
essential innovations in the intellectual property realm.
Part II of this note introduces patent reform by addressing the purpose underlying
the modification process and detailing the development of patent law, which originated
with the Patent Act of 1970. Part III is divided into a total of nine sections, with each
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section devoted to a discussion of a pertinent component of the Patent Reform Act of
2010. Section A describes the patent application process and addresses the proposal of a
first-to-file protocol. Section B explains the adjustment to the amount of damages
resulting from infringement under the reform. Section C further comments on
infringement damages, while chiefly focusing on willful infringement and the increased
burden on the plaintiffs. Section D discusses enhancement of reexamination procedures
and post grant proceedings. Section E details the pre-existing “best mode” standard and
examines whether a possible reformation could provide relief to patent holders. Section
F entails a brief overview of claims and damages related to false marking. Finally,
sections G, H, and I extend the discussion of principle modifications under the Patent
Reform Act of 2010 to minor reformations affecting litigation venue, fee setting
authority, and patent law education within the district court system. Part IV concludes
this note.
II. Historical Understanding of Patent Reform
A. The Purpose of Patent Reform
The United States Constitution has protected inventions and designs in order to
encourage creativity and innovation by giving Congress the power to “promote the
[p]rogress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited [t]imes to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries….”1 The
patent system was integrated into the U.S. Constitution by the founding fathers with the
intention of safeguarding the intellectual property rights of the people. Patent reform
serves as an avenue through which the priorities of the American patent system can
progress by “bolster[ing] economic development, sustain[ing] American innovation, and
1

U.S CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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protect[ing] American jobs.”2 By placing a stronger emphasis on the first-to-file method,
willful infringement, and reexamination through patent reform, the patent system will
boost its objectives, as well as advance the technological innovation and creative abilities
of the Nation.3 The efforts and effects of past patent reform acts pale in comparison to
the Patent Reform Act of 2010 in furthering the inherent goals of patent reform.
The objectives established by the Patent Reform Act of 2010 make innovative
designs more visible without causing inventors to fear the loss of their patent rights.4
Diverging substantially from past patent reform acts, the Patent Reform Act of 2010
endeavors to harmonize the United States’ patent law system with those of the rest of the
world by streamlining the patent process and reducing the potential for abuse of patent
laws through unnecessary litigation.5 This goal of international harmonization through
patent reform is a platform different from years past, thereby providing the Patent Reform
Act of 2010 with a greater advantage for passage by Congress.
B. The Chronology of Patent Reform
Since the 1700s, American patent law has endured significant changes due to
economic developments within the country.6 In 1790, the Patent Act was introduced and
it established a fourteen-year restriction on the length of patent terms.7 The Patent Act of
1793 replaced the traditional registration system with an examination system, though the
2

The Patent Reform Act: Securing American Innovation – Creating American Jobs, PATRICK LEAHY,
http://leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/041910PatentReformSupport.pdf (last visited June 29, 2011).
3
See Arti Rai, Stuart Graham & Mark Doms, Patent Reform: Unleashing Innovation, Promoting
Economic Growth & Producing High-Paying Jobs, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE (Apr. 13, 2010),
http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/migrated/Patent_Reform-paper.pdf.
4
Jonathan W. Parthum & Philippe J.C. Signore, Patent Reform: The Debate Continues into 2010, 2010
PAT. L. ANN. 355, 358.
5
See Stephen Albainy-Jenei, The Patent Reform Act of 2010: A Substitute S.515, PATENT BARISTAS (Mar.
5, 2010), http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2010/03/05/the-patent-reform-act-of-2010-a-substitute-s515/.
6
See A Brief History of the Patent Law of the United States, LADAS & PARRY,
http://ladas.com/Patents/USPatentHistory.html (last updated July 17, 2009).
7
See id.
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original system was reintroduced in the Patent Act of 1836.8 Thirty-four years later, the
Patent Act of 1870 expanded the initial fourteen-year patent term to seventeen years.9
Not until the Patent Act of 1952, did Congress attempt to limit the scope of patentable
subject matter by specifying the word “process,” and thus impart a document that would
serve as the foundation for the current United States patent laws.10
In the last decade, the first true attempt at an official patent reform occurred with
the onset of congressional meetings in March 2001.11 However, patent reform then stood
dormant for four years; substantial action did not take place again until 2005. The Patent
Reform Act of 2005 gained the support of many major corporations, and proposed the
“first-to-file” method, a process already followed by the rest of the world.12 The Patent
Reform Act of 2007 further developed the notion of progressing the United States’ patent
laws towards a system similar to those of other countries.13 Both the 2007 and 2009
Patent Reform Acts were unable to gain Senate support. The Patent Reform Act of 2010
seeks to resolve prior congressional disputes through amendments made to the Reform
Act of 2009. 14
If the Patent Reform Act of 2010 comes to fruition, it would be the largest patent
system reformation in the last fifty years.15 American patent law has felt pressure to
coordinate with the rest of the world in order to create international balance and diminish
confusion. The Obama administration strongly and openly believes these 2010
amendments will greatly benefit American innovation, and thereby serves as a positive
8

See id.
See id.
10
See id.
11
See id.
12
See id.
13
See id.
14
See Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 360.
15
See id. at 357.
9
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influence on Congress.16 After years of pressure to synchronize its patent law system
with the systems used by the rest of the world, the United States may utilize the Patent
Reform Act of 2010 as a leveling tool for dealing with foreign intellectual property. 17
III. Overview of Amendment S.515 (Patent Reform Act of 2010)
The Patent Reform Act of 2010 is more commonly referred to as Amendment S.
515 (hereafter referred to as A.S. 515). Of the many reformations A.S. 515 proposes, the
most significant concerns are: (1) the first-to-file system and its effect on 35 U.S.C. §
102(b) and § 102(g); (2) damage awards; (3) willful infringement; (4) reexamination and
post grant proceedings; (5) best mode; (6) false marking; (7) litigation venue; (8) fee
setting authority; and (9) patent education in the district courts.
A. Which Inventors Should be Granted Patent Rights?
The “first-to-file” protocol is one of the most significant issues discussed in
current patent reform since 2005.18 Under this system, the first inventor to (1) file his
invention with any United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and (2) gain
patent approval by the USPTO, is granted full patent rights.19 First-to-file significantly
differs from the “first-to-invent” system currently used by the United States.20 Under the
first-to-invent system, the patent process is more time consuming because patent
examiners must determine the identity of the first inventor through interference
proceedings, a requirement that does not exist in the first-to-file system.21 Until now, the
United States has refused to switch systems, although A.S. 515’s endorsement of the
16

Vincent LoTempio, Patent Reform Act of 2010: An Overview, LOTEMPIO L. BLOG (May 3, 2010),
http://www.lotempiolaw.com/2010/05/articles/patents/patent-reform-act-of-2010-an-overview/.
17
Id.
18
See Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 374.
19
See id.
20
See id.
21
See id.
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first-to-file procedure could provide many indispensable modifications to the current U.S.
patent system.
1. The Effect on § 102(g) Priority Date
Under the present first-to-invent system, patent examiners have the burden of
determining the origin of an innovation through interference proceedings.22 The Manual
of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) defines interference proceedings as occurring
when an inventor claims his invention preceded that of another’s, resulting in the need for
an examiner to analyze each claim, along with any extrinsic evidence, in order to
determine “dates of conception and reduction to practice” per conditions of 35 U.S.C. §
102(g).23 Although 35 U.S.C. § 135 governs the majority of interference proceedings, §
102(g) places a standard of reasonable diligence on inventors who were “first to conceive
and last to reduce to practice ….”24 According to USPTO director David Kappos,
interference proceedings occur only .01% of the time; as a result, he feels “we already
essentially have a first inventor to file system.”25 Therefore, the transition to a first-tofile system should not create many additional difficulties and would result in the
elimination of all interference proceedings, consequently eliminating the arduous task of
determining 102(g) priority dates of claims.

22

Michael F. Martin, Article, The End of the First-to-Invent Rule: A Concise History of its Origin, 49
IDEA 435, 467 (2009).
23
See Manuel of Patent Examining Procedure: § 2301.03 Interfering Subject Matter, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2300_2301_03.htm#sec2301.03 (last modified
Dec. 18, 2008); 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(g) (West 1999).
24
35 U.S.C.A. § 102(g) (West 1999); 35 U.S.C.A. § 135 (West 1999).
25
Vincent LoTempio, “Patent Reform Act of 2010” and “First Inventor to File” Rule Change, LOTEMPIO
L. BLOG (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.lotempiolaw.com/2010/03/articles/patents/patent-reform-act-of-2010and-first-inventor-to-file-rule-change/.
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2. The Effect on 102(b) Statutory Bar
Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), grace periods are allotted to inventors that allows them
to publically disclose their inventions one year prior to the earliest filing date.26 If the
inventors fail to file within one year from their disclosure, all patent rights are lost.27 A
transfer to the first-to-file method, under A.S. 515, would eliminate “the one-year grace
period unless the inventor was the ‘first discloser’.”28 Inventors are the “first disclosers”
if they file an application first with any patent office.29 Under A.S. 515, there is no
longer a need for this time limitation. By permitting inventors to file their invention in
any patent office, the need for a grace period is obsolete. Foreign inventors would
greatly benefit by no longer being held to separate standards when filing for a patent
within the United States.
3. Proponents and Opponents of the First-to-File System
Foreign and domestic corporations, like Bose, ExxonMobil, and Microsoft, are
major proponents of the first-to-file system because reformation will help streamline the
“international harmonization” of the patent process, in addition to also mitigating issues
stemming from dissimilarities in the systems of the U.S. and surrounding countries.30
Collectively, these companies want the U.S. to accommodate their interests in the patent
system reform in order to help them avoid international adversity. The first-to-file

26

See Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 376.
Id.
28
Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Act of 2010: An Overview, PAT. L. BLOG (Mar. 8, 2010),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/patent-reform-act-of-2010-an-overview.html.
29
See ROGER WILLIAM ET AL., THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS 37
(William Clowes & Sons, Ltd. 1900).
30
See Crouch, supra note 28.
27
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system replaces interference proceedings with accurate derivation proceedings, ensuring
respective inventors are first to file, a major benefit to these large corporations.31
A majority of the opponents to the first-to-file system are “independent inventors,
small businesses, and universities.”32 These entities argue that larger companies have
greater resources, both financially and technologically, and thus possess a clear
advantage in the race to file at any patent office.33 The variance in the amount of
resources makes it difficult for smaller companies to compete in the marketplace.34 As a
result, they are wary of elimination of the current one-year grace period provided under
the first-to-invent system.
4. Overall Significance of First-to-File
While possible that independent inventors and smaller companies may have fewer
resources than larger corporations, such individuals and small entities gain an advantage
in the first-to-file system with “provisional filing.” Independent inventors can file a
provisional patent application within one year of completing their designs.35 Such
applications provide inventors with a simplified method by which to acquire an earlier
filing date with relative ease, thus reducing the potential disadvantages resulting from the
loss of the one-year grace period.36 Aside from mitigating any advantageous gains
experienced by larger corporations, the first-to-file method also benefits the U.S. patent
system by unifying the American innovative market with that of the rest of the world.
31

First-to-File vs. First-to-Invent: Who Really Benefits from Changing the U.S. Patent System?, GEN.
PATENT CORP., http://www.generalpatent.com/first-file-vs-first-invent-who-really-benefits-changing-u-spatent-system (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
32
Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 375.
33
Michael A. Glenn, Article, Article I and the First Inventor to File: Patent Reform or Doublespeak?, 59
IDEA 441, 458 (2010).
34
Id.
35
Vito J. DeBari, International Harmonization of Patent Law: A Proposed Solution to the United States’
First-to-File Debate, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 687, 713 (1993).
36
Id. at 711.
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Countries such as India and China are prospering through innovation, and their success
illustrates how an internationally harmonized patent system would ultimately benefit the
United States.
B. How Should Damages be Proven?
Immersed within A.S. 515 is a damages clause that requires courts to “identify the
methodologies and factors that are relevant to the determination of damages, and …
consider only those methodologies and factors relevant to making such determination.”37
The proposed statute also increases the responsibility among parties by maintaining that
every party must “state, in writing and with particularity, the methodologies and factors
the parties propose for instruction to the jury in determining damages … specifying the
relevant underlying legal and factual bases for their assertions.”38 Moreover, the
amendment adheres to a stricter standard than the current damages section in the Patent
Reform Act of 2009 by requiring “the court [to] award the claimant damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement….”39 By instilling a stricter analysis requirement before
awarding damages, A.S. 515 reduces the opportunity for plaintiffs to take advantage of
jury sympathies and the lax damages standards found in the 2009 Reform Act.
Only when a party lacks “evidentiary basis” is a jury allowed to consider the
specific methodologies brought by each party and grant “summary judgment on
damages” under A.S. 515.40 By compelling an analysis that meets the “methodologies
and factors” criteria, courts are forced to assume the role of gatekeeper, with duties that
involve protecting parties from excessive damages without specifically limiting damages

37

S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(b) (2009).
Id. § 4(b)(2).
39
35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (West 2000).
40
Crouch, supra note 28.
38
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for the infringed parties.41 As gatekeeper, courts have flexibility in choosing methods for
determining reasonable royalty damages in patent infringement suits.42 Unlike the 2009
Reform Act, which attempted to reform the court’s role in proper damage determination,
A.S. 515 uses a “methodologies and factors” criteria in conjunction with the factors set
out in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.43 in order to provide a more
thorough analysis.44 The fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors include:
[1] Royalties patentee receives for licensing the patent in suit; [2] Rates licensee
pays for use of other comparable to the patent in suit… [4] Licensor’s established
policy and marketing program to maintain patent monopoly by not
licensing others to use the invention; [5] Commercial relationship between
licensor and licensee, such as whether they are competitors or inventor and
promoter…[7] Duration of patent and term of license; [8] Established profitability
of the products made under the patent, its commercial success and its current
popularity; [9] Utility and advantages of patent property over old modes and
devices… [11] The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention
and the value of such use; [12] The portion of profit or selling price customarily
allowed for the use of the invention….45
The adjustments to the damages section of the 2009 Reform Act are likely to gain
support during congressional hearings due to the addition of the “methodologies and
factors” requirement. This section is expected to result in swift and harsh punishment
that is not excessive or unfair. The heightened standard is beneficial to all parties and
restructures a damage and royalty calculation system that currently proves to be difficult
in a “dynamic marketplace.”46 The enhanced role of courts ensures fairness and
uniformity among damage awards, and provides an increasingly clear picture of the
standard required of parties in a case.
41

See Albainy-Jenei, supra note 5.
35 U.S.C.A. § 284.
43
See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
44
See Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 362.
45
Georgia-Pacific Factors for Determining Reasonable Royalty, SUNSTEINLAW,
http://www.sunsteinlaw.com/media/Georgia-Pacific.pdf (last visited May 30, 2011).
46
See Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 362.
42
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C. Willful Infringement
Under the current patent law system, “the court may increase the damages up to
three times the amount found or assessed” when willful infringement is found.47 A.S.
515 proposes a specific definition for the term “willful.” By assigning a concrete
meaning to this word, the present requirement that a court require proof of “objective
reasonableness” by the infringer becomes obsolete and a more stringent standard takes its
place.48 The reform states that to be “willful” a party must be found “objectively
reckless” by “clear and convincing evidence.”49 Possible proof of “objective recklessness
[would exist] if the infringer was acting despite an objectively high likelihood that his
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent….”50 A verdict of willful infringement
is not solely based on the infringer’s particular “knowledge of the infringed patent.”51
Instead, the plaintiff has a burden to prove more than “knowledge alone” to have a viable
willful infringement claim; therefore, more specific and articulate facts will be required,
and all cases wavering the “clear and convincing” line should be decided in favor of the
defendant.52
Proponents of willful infringement reform believe the transition will not be
difficult, primarily because the current patent law system already uses “clear and
convincing evidence.”53 The heightened burden of proof placed upon infringed parties
eases the probability that a defendant will be charged for willful infringement, and thus

47

35 U.S.C.A. § 284.
See In re Seagate Technology, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
49
S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(d)(1) (2009).
50
Id.
51
Id. § 4(d)(3).
52
Crouch, supra note 28.
53
In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
48
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face high penalty damages.54 Such proponents also believe there will be less of an
incentive to file “time-consuming willfulness claims” due to the higher burden, therefore
providing relief to both the court and the parties of the “length and [costs] of patent
litigation.”55
Reform opponents, on the other hand, contend that it is already too difficult under
the current system of “objective reasonableness” for infringed parties to claim damages
when “willful infringement” has occurred.56 Further, a heightened standard, as proposed
in A.S. 515, would make it even more arduous for infringed parties to truly obtain
reasonable damages.57
A higher burden of proof is seemingly appropriate for willful infringement cases
due to the time-constraints faced by courts with presumably large dockets. Society could
benefit by a reduction in the amount of litigation of burdensome and repetitive
willfulness claims brought by desperate patent holders. With this reform, petty willful
infringement claims are likely to become extinct, and thus release some of the strain on
the resources of the court.
D. Opportunities to Correct an Issued Patent
1. Reexamination Process
The USPTO uses a procedure called “reexamination” to correct an already issued
patent, when new evidence is presented concerning third party claims to the patent.58

54

See David R. Clonts, The Federal Circuit Puts the Willfulness Back Into Willful Infringement, INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L.J., Dec. 2007, at 9, 12.
55
Christopher Lanks, In re Seagate: Effects and Future Development of Willful Patent Infringement, 111
W. VA. L. REV. 607, 633 (2009).
56
See Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 366.
57
See Clonts, supra note 54, at 637.
58
See Robert J. Yarbrough, Patent Reexamination, YARBROUGH LAW,
http://yarbroughlaw.com/Publications/pubs%20patent3%20Patent%20Reexamination.htm (last visited Feb.
23, 2011).
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The reexamination process has been a steady and reliable tool in lieu of patent litigation,
which can be costly and time consuming.59 The patent holder benefits from the
reexamination process because it provides an opportunity to narrow the claims of their
patent “in light of [any newfound] prior art” that the examiner might not have previously
discovered.60
There are two types of reexamination proceedings, ex parte and inter partes. Ex
parte proceedings arise when the USPTO determines there is a “substantial new question
of patentability.”61 Any person may file for a reexamination proceeding during the
enforceability period of the patent, though they are not allowed to be present at the
reexamination proceeding.62 The reexamination process proved significant during
proceedings in NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. Research in Motion (RIM) found
prior art, which it used to invalidate NTP’s patents.63 The USPTO examined thousands
of pages that had been turned in by both RIM and NTP through reexamination
proceedings, and eventually rejected two of NTP’s patents.64
Inter partes proceedings are similar to ex parte proceedings in that they both entail
a USPTO determination of the presence of a “substantial question of patentability.”65 A
crucial difference is that a third party requester can participate in the inter partes
examination proceedings upon the condition that the patent “application was filed on or

59

Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 368.
See Yarbrough, supra note 58.
61
35 U.S.C.A. § 303(a) (West 2002).
62
Manuel of Patent Examining Procedure: § 2209 Ex Parte Reexamination, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mprep/documents/2200_2209.htm#sect2209 (last modified
Dec. 18, 2008).
63
See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 2d 785 (E.D. Va 2005).
64
See id.
65
35 U.S.C.A § 313 (West 2002).
60
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after November 29, 1999 ….”66 Although third party requesters may partake in the
proceedings, they are estopped from later asserting that a claim is invalid based on
assertions that were raised or “could have [been] raised” at the proceeding.67
A.S. 515 focuses on inter partes proceedings by paying close attention to removal
of the language “could have been raised” from the statute.68 The elimination of this
phrase serves to provide a third party requester with protection from the estoppel effect
discussed above. In addition to the language amendment, A.S. 515 also proposes that an
administrative patent judge be required to preside over all ex parte and inter partes
hearings.69 In effect, a judge of this nature possesses more knowledge of the patent
application, as well as the patent process as a whole.70
2. Post-Grant Review Process
Under the new reform, a process akin to the reexamination proceeding is
introduced; it is called “post-grant review.”71 The post-grant review replaces litigation by
allowing third parties to challenge a patent after issuance.72 During the post-grant
process, the USPTO reviews the basis of whether one or more claims of a patent are
invalid.”73 Unlike reexamination, post-grant review is only available nine months after a
patent has been issued.74 Also, this type of evaluation is handled directly by the patent

66

Manuel of Patent Examining Procedure: § 2609 Optional Inter Partes Reexamination, U.S. PAT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2600_2609.htm#sect2609
(last modified Dec. 18, 2008).
67
Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 368.
68
S. 515, 111th Cong. § 5(a) (2009).
69
See id.
70
Id. § 6(b).
71
Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 369.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. § 5(c).
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appeals board, and a “supplemental examination” ensures that the patent holder has
completed his “duty of disclosure.”75
Generally, a post-grant review can supplement the reexamination process, though
A.S. 515 permits post-grant review to replace reexamination when there is “a showing
that the petition raises a novel or unsettled legal question.”76 Extending the use of the
post-grant review is likely to be beneficial to all those involved. Apprehensions
associated with reexamination, such as its time consuming nature and inability to
consistently avoid litigation, are of no substantial concern with post-grant reviews.
Moreover, the post-grant review process is “not limited to patents and printed
publications” like the reexamination proceeding.77 Overall, the post-grant review process
can have a “dampening effect on aggressive patent portfolio strategies” and provide
further fundamental patent review.78
3. Proponents and Opponents of Reexamination and Post-Grant
Although both the advocates and the opponents of A.S. 515 have their qualms,
there remains little conflict between the groups regarding the reexamination and postgrant review processes. A few individuals fear an increase in post-grant reviews will
slow an inefficient patent review process; however, it can be countered that a three panel
judging board could “enhance the process’s reliability.”79 Conversely, some individuals
maintain that a lower standard of reexamination will result in an increase of post-grant

75

Crouch, supra note 28.
S. 515, § 5(b).
77
Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 370.
78
Bronwyn H. Hall, Post-Grant Patent Review, BERKELEY (Apr. 16, 2004),
https://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/BHH04_BCLT%20handout.pdf.
79
Stephen G. Kunun, Article, The Metamorphis of Inter Partes Reexamination, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
971, 988 (2004).
76
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reviews that invalidate “only bad patents;” therefore, ascertaining that a post-grant review
process will allow for a quicker and cheaper system, while maintaining accuracy.80
Overall, the “could have been raised” estoppel effect has hindered many third
parties from adequately challenging the validity of a patent.81 Thus, the reformation will
reduce the estoppel’s effect, resulting in an increased quality of future patent applications
and a curtailment of the lengthy review process. Overall, the inter partes reexamination
and post-grant process should be more beneficial than detrimental to the patent process.
E. Is Best Mode a Necessary Requirement?
Under the current patent statute, an inventor is required to disclose the method, or
best way, “of carrying out [the] invention.”82 If this condition is ignored, an inventor
would likely lose in litigation due to the insufficiency of fulfilling this requirement,
regardless of the merits behind the claim.83 This rigid obligation is an elevated issue in
the current best mode system. Although the best mode requirement aspires to improve
the quality of disclosure by allowing the public to recognize the societal need for an
invention, its unduly subjective standard results in both time and money being wasted on
the search for information that could show an inventor concealed evidence, and therefore
knew of the particular best mode at the time of filing his or her application.84 A.S. 515
appears to support the best mode requirement; aside from eliminating the invalidation
clause, which terminates a patent during litigation upon noncompliance with the best

80

Matthew Sag, Article, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 95 (2007).
See Parthum & Signore, supra note 4, at 368.
82
35 U.S.C.A § 112 (West 1975).
83
Id.
84
See Vincent LoTempio, “Patent Reform Act of 2010” and Best Mode Requirement, LOTEMPIO L. BLOG
(Apr. 3, 2010), http://www.lotempiolaw.com/2010/04/articles/patents/patent-reform-act-of-2010a-and-bestmode-requirement/.
81
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mode requirement, A.S. 515 essentially leaves the remaining best mode requisites
intact.85
Proponents of the amendment believe the best mode requirement is an
unnecessary distraction during litigation, because it precludes the court from focusing on
the merits of the patent application.86 They believe that by removing the best mode from
litigation, it will forestall the loss of exceptional patents in the future, an issue many
patents have met due to the hierarchy of the best mode requirement over the specific
claims aligned with the patent application itself. 87
On the other hand, opponents of the reform reason that the public needs to be
informed of the best method used by the inventor in order to foster innovation and
creativity.88 They maintain that if this requirement is removed, patent applicants will
withhold important technical pieces of their invention from the public, resulting in quick,
though possibly inept, litigation.89
By and large, patent invalidation due to failure to meet best mode requirements
seems unnecessary and is an effortless conduit for removal of an exceptional patent by a
challenging party with no substantial consideration allotted to the merits. Procedural
issues should not serve as a shortcut in which to disclaim a patent. Instead, courts and the
USPTO should base all patent applications on the merits of the application itself. The
current patent act grants third party challengers the ability to needlessly burden the patent
holders, and in turn, stifles innovation and creativity. A.S. 515 is capable of reversing
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this effect by providing a way for patent holders to reclaim their inventions and the
public, their creativity.
F. Public Deception Through False Marking of Products
The false marking statute allows “any person” to file a false marking claim, even
if damages are minimal or non-existent.90 The false marking statute intends to deter
public deception through false marks on unpatented products that falsely indicate that the
product has been patented or has a patent pending.91 Although the false marking statute
operates to protect the public and promote competition, it still remains the center of much
debate.92
In Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Company, the Federal circuit held that “a fine
of ‘not more than $500’” may be awarded to an infringed party on a per article basis,
instead of a traditional award of single damages per violation.93 The court’s ruling
resulted in an increase of litigation pertaining to false marking statute violations.94 Due
to the per article damage analysis, the possibility for copious penalties increased, causing
plaintiffs to strive to take advantage of the subsequently generous damage awards.95
Under A.S. 515, an individual must have “suffered a competitive injury as a result
of a violation of [the] section…” in order to meet the standing requirement needed to file
a false marking claim.96 This amendment is substantial in comparison to the “any
person” standard required under current patent law.97
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Those in favor of narrowing the class of people eligible to sue argue that
increasing the burden of potential infringed patent holders will benefit the court system
by forestalling much of the litigation that arises as a result of the Forest Group holding.98
Thus, the false marking statute accomplishes the significant goals of reducing patent
litigation and controversy.
In opposition to the reform of the false marking statute are those who feel the
amendments portray ambiguous language which creates an excessive burden on the
plaintiff to prove “competitive injury.”99 Such uncertainty has many individuals worried
about the costs that will arise as a result of this heightened standard.100
It seems apparent that the courts will benefit greatly by a reduction of false
marking litigation due to an increased burden upon the plaintiff to prove that he or she
sustained a “competitive injury.” Although it might initially be difficult to define
“competitive injury,” court precedent will eventually establish its limits and boundaries.
The increased burden will reduce unnecessary litigation and prevent defendants from
having to pay heinous damages in false marking suits.
G. Where Should Patent Litigation Reside?
The objective of “venue statutes is to protect defendants from the inconvenience
of having to defend … [themselves] in a trial court that” may be prejudicial or
controversial.101 Currently, venue in patent infringement suits may be brought either (a)
“where the defendant resides;” or (b) “where the defendant has committed acts … and
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has a regular and established place of business.”102 Historically, jurisdiction has proven
to be an issue for many corporations as they are subject to personal jurisdiction in many
states. A.S. 515 allows transfer of venue only “upon a showing that the transferee venue
is clearly more convenient than the venue in which the civil action is pending.”103
Proponents of this transfer of venue reform tend to be larger corporations that
have significant concerns regarding “forum shopping by smaller companies,” as well as
plaintiffs who take advantage of the lax venue requirements that are currently in use.104
These advocates are seemingly satisfied with this amendment, because although the
“proposed reform does not change the method of determining venue,” it still provides
possible relief.105
Of course, the opponents of this additional venue option are smaller corporations
who want the added advantage over corporations with deep pockets.106 Additionally,
there is an underlying belief that the preferable, or most appropriate, venue will not be
chosen because a limited number of courts in the nation have the “expertise and
timeliness” to handle patent infringement cases.107 Therefore, these individuals further
believe that unfamiliar courts will handle a greater number of patent infringement cases,
possibly resulting in an adverse effect on the purpose and policy of intellectual property
law.108 As a solution, some argue that there should only be one major appellate court, the
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Federal Circuit, that handles all appellate decisions in order to reduce any advantages that
forum shopping may offer.109
Ultimately, there should be benefits available for large corporations which are
heavily involved in litigation. The amendment provides such relief by disabling smaller
parties from taking advantage of forum shopping tactics. Congress has been under the
heavy influence of these larger corporations to pass this bill, thus even if only a portion of
A.S. 515 is passed, the venue reformation has significant support and is likely to be a
viable contender.
H. Who Sets Proper Filing Fees?
Currently, the USPTO does not have complete rulemaking authority to set fees
during the patent process.110 There are many areas of fee setting that are left to Congress
and the judiciary, primarily to prevent the USPTO from developing a monopoly over the
patent process.111 A.S. 515 states that, “The Director shall have authority to set or adjust
by rule any fee established or charged by the Office…[provided that] fee amounts are in
the aggregate set to recover the estimated cost to the Office for processing, activities,
services and materials relating to patents and trademarks, respectively….”112 The
language suggests that the purpose of the reformation is to provide the USPTO with
proper authority to adjust any regulatory fees, though congruently safeguard against the
Director being able to hold the authority to ensure that specific “fees…remain [within]
the Office.”113
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Members of USPTO favor this revision because providing the USPTO with feesetting authority could help the USPTO set up an intelligent and thorough financial plan
for the future.114 USPTO Director David Kappos has stated that the Office plans to
receive “between $146 and $232 million more than its appropriated amount in FY
2010.”115 This money could be used to benefit the USPTO by providing resources to
help improve patent efficiency.116
Currently, the main opponents of this reform are members of the American
Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) who believe that Congress needs to
ensure that fees paid by inventors will be used specifically to process patent applications,
instead of used to fund other ambiguous needs established by the USPTO.117 In addition
to AIPLA, there are many individuals who maintain that the USPTO fee structure is not
the cause of its problems, but instead its inefficient management of time, as well as its
inability to manage the bulk of patent applications.118
USPTO should receive some control over the fee structure because it has the
ability to use the surplus money to create more examiner positions for the review and
evaluation of patent applications. The major concerns over the USPTO’s efficiency and
time management may be put to rest if the USPTO was able to train and/or hire more
examiners for the future. As David Kappos states, this reform makes certain “the USPTO
gets the funding it desperately needs to operate efficiently and to protect the intellectual
property rights of all innovators.”119
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I. Educating Courts on Patent Law
Implementation of a trial program may be a minor issue compared to other major
reformation topics discussed thus far, although it is not less significant. Such a program
could educate district courts across the country on patent litigation. A.S. 515 establishes
various pilot programs that will run for a duration of ten years in the courts with the
greatest number of patent protection cases filed this past year.120 The USPTO is
dedicated to spending money on this program to develop these courts, and the Director
has stated that at least five million dollars will be spent on training the judges on major
patent issues, as well as hiring law clerks with patent expertise.121
This program will serve as a major tool to help prepare district courts for intricate
issues that may appear during patent litigation.122 Congress will have authority over the
program during its implementation by being able to require trial courts to furnish detailed
reports about each case.123 With this program, patent litigation could become more
efficient and fair throughout the nation.
IV. Conclusion
The Patent Reform Act of 2010 has the ability to majorly impact the United States
patent realm, and it is an exciting time for those who interact with the patent system.
Although this decade has faced a low passage rate of prior patent reform acts, it seems
that the Patent Reform Act of 2010 has tried to maintain a balance between the
proponents and opponents of patent reform.
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The first-to-file system will unify the United States’ system with those of the rest
of the world, and will provide large companies with a strategic and innovative advantage
in the market. There are many changes to the damages provision that will reduce
litigation in courts due to the higher burden placed upon parties. Judicial efficiency is
always a major concern for the courts, which is why the increased burden within the
damages and false marking provisions greatly improves the chances for this patent reform
bill to pass in Congress. Furthermore, reexaminations and post-grant reviews will refine
the patent system and its accuracy by providing in-depth examinations of patents that
have already been filed.
Whether Congress concentrates on the major reforms such as first-to-file, or the
minor ones such as the pilot program, each piece of the Patent Reform Act of 2010 plays
an integral role in transforming U.S. patent law. Though it seems that patent reform may
not have made significant progress in recent history, the Patent Reform Act of 2010 can
serve as the catalyst that takes the U.S. patent system to the next level. Regardless of
whether the Patent Reform Act of 2010 is passed by Congress this year, a major
transformation appears to be in the near future.
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